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Introduction
The year 2005 marked the one hundredth anniversary of the end of the Russo-
Japanese War in the summer of 1905 and the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the 
Pacific War or the Asia-Pacific War in the summer of 1945.  These two wars are 
very significant when Japan-U.S. relations are put into consideration:  the former 
marked a turning point from friendship to hostility, and the latter the beginning of 
Japan’s sixty-year subordination to the U.S., in which the Japanese people have 
ironically enjoyed their happiness and economic prosperity in their sixty-year-long 
peace and stability in the shadow of the U.S. physical presence in their homeland. 
On the other hand, the year 2005 was colored by wave after wave of hostility 
between Japan and its neighboring nations such as South Korea and China which 
have particularly recently blamed Japan for its crimes upon their people and lands 
committed by its militarism in the first half of the twentieth century, primarily 
because of Japanese Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi’s annual visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine.  Prime Minister Koizumi has never failed to pay a visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine once a year since he took office, sticking to his public pledge 
to visit the Shrine “on August 15” he made at the time of the Liberal Democratic 
Party presidential election in 2001.  Over his visits to the Shrine, there has been 
criticism on both sides of the Sea of Japan ― between Japan and South Korea and 
China, making East Asia a capricious and fragile region.
Tense relations have never been eased;  they were more critically intensified 
last year.  Prime Minister Koizumi stubbornly preached the importance of the 
Japan-U.S. alliance as if it were the only pillar in Japan’s relations with the rest 
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of the world.  On November 16, 2005, for example, he said at the summit with 
President George W. Bush in Kyoto:
The United States remains the most indispensable ally to Japan.  And if ― the 
better our bilateral relations, the easier it would be for us to establish better relations 
with China and other neighboring countries, and the countries in the world.  There 
is no such thing as U.S.-Japan relationship too close.  Some people maintain that 
maybe we would pay more attention to other issues, probably it would be better to 
strengthen the relationship with other countries. . . .  The U.S.-Japan relationship, 
the closer, the more intimate it is, it is easier for us to behave and establish better 
relations with China, with South Korea and other nations in Asia. (White House, p. 1.)
Prime Minister Koizumi has been refused a meeting by Chinese and South Korean 
political leaders because of his visits to the shrine which honors Class-A war 
criminals who led the last war, which both China and South Korea have believed 
to be a symbol of Japanese militarism in the first half of the twentieth century 
throughout Asia.  On January 4, 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi defended his 
annual visits to the memorial to the war dead of Japan, even though they have 
so far contributed to the freezing of Japanese foreign relations with its neighbors 
such as China and South Korea.  What is worse, he criticized the two countries of 
worsening relations with Japan, accusing them of interfering in Japanese domestic 
matters. “I can’t understand why foreign governments would intervene in a 
spiritual matter and try to turn it into a diplomatic problem,” he said, “I’ve never 
once closed the door to negotiations with China and south Korea.” (The Daily 
Yomiuri, p. 1.)
Thus, Japan celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific 
War, while some Asian nations have never forgotten nor forgiven what Japanese 
militarism brought to them toward the very end of the nineteenth century and in 
the first half of the twentieth century when Japan colonized the Korean Peninsula 
and then invaded China, just as some European nations had done in East Asia. 
Even now, China and South Korea have criticized what Japanese militarism did 
in the first half of the twentieth century.  It seems to this author that past Japanese 
militarism, which still taints Japan’s relations with some Asian nations, has much 
to do with Japanese modernization or Westernization which Japan launched in 
the middle of the nineteenth century.  Then the United States ventured to open 
Japan’s closed doors to the West by sending Commodore Mathew Galbraith 
Perry to Japan in 1853, and he succeeded in concluding the Treaty of Kanagawa 
on March 31, 1854.  This treaty paved the way both to Japan’s exposure to the 
Western World values and to its dealing with neighboring nations in East Asia. 
Thus East Asia became a battleground for creating a new order, replacing the 
Chinese order, at the very beginning of the twentieth century, in which the United 
States, Russia, Japan and Great Britain fought for predominance.  Specifically 
speaking, the United States and Russia each tried to make its sphere of influence 
in East Asia, and the United States under the Theodore Roosevelt Administration, 
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successfully and unsuccessfully, could make its manifested overshadowing 
presence there prominent, particularly in the wake of the conclusion of the 
Portsmouth Treaty to end the Russo-Japanese War in August 1905.
This author aims to pay a lot of attention to United States policy, domestic 
and foreign, Japanese responses to American diplomatic endeavors and its 
commitment to modernization in the Meiji Era, and receding European presence 
in East Asia toward the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of 
the twentieth century.  In so doing, some part of rising Japanese militarism and 
Japan’s uneasy relations with the United States from friendship to hostility will 
be briefly explained, so that a clue will be given to the more chilly state of current 
Japan’s political relations with some Asian nations sixty years after the end of 
the last war and to sixty years of Japan’s subordination to the United States in the 
post-Asia-Pacific War era, primarily because of its military involvement in United 
States military strategy.
United States Expansion, Continental and Overseas:
The Perry Expedition to Japan
When it comes to the history of Japan-U.S. relations, the Perry Expedition 
could be a landmark:  Commodore Mathew Galbraith Perry was sent to Japan in 
the Millard Fillmore Administration in 1852, arriving at the bay of Edo, on the 
afternoon of July 8, 1853.  The fact is that an American attempt to open Japan had 
been made as early as 1846 and Secretary of State Daniel Webster prepared the 
first draft of the letter to the Japanese emperor in May 1851, even before Perry 
was given command.  This attempt could easily be interpreted as an American 
interest in overseas expansion as an extension of its continental expansion in the 
form of Manifest Destiny.  It is often described that about half a decade from 
1848 to 1854 was a period of not only the most high-spirited efforts of continental 
expansion but also the first flirting adventures for overseas territory.  Incidentally 
the so-called continental expansion was completed by the Gadsden Purchase on 
December 30, 1853.  Overseas expansion was undoubtedly sensed, clearly shown 
in the instructions to Commodore Perry given in a dispatch from the Acting 
Secretary of State, C. M. Conrad to the Secretary of the Navy, John P. Kennedy:
Recent events ― the navigation of the ocean by steam, the acquisition and rapid 
settlement by this country of a vast territory on the Pacific, the discovery of gold in 
that region, the rapid communication established across the isthmus which separates 
the two oceans ― have practically brought the countries of the east in closer 
proximity to our own;  although the consequences of these events have scarcely 
begun to be felt, the intercourse between them has already increased, and no limits 
can be assigned to its future extension. (Bartlett, p. 269.)
It is safe to say that the United States began to look westward across the 
Pacific at East Asia, making itself a participant in the game of power rivalry 
in East Asia, in which Japan was then almost isolated and little influenced by 
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European powers.  In fact, before Perry, some European nations such as Great 
Britain, Spain, and Russia, which was in the middle of the nineteenth century 
most positive and aggressive in approaching Japan for mercantile enterprise, 
had attempted to open Japan’s closed doors for commercial intercourse.  And 
the United States was most keenly aware of Russia’s interests in Japan, so it is 
unquestionable that the United States had great concern about Russia’s expansion 
into East Asia and even into Japan.
Thus even though the objects of the Perry expedition sought by his 
government were mainly commercial, the United States was concerned about 
Russia’s expansionist approach to Japan which the United States feared would 
possibly result in Japan’s being put into the Russian sphere of influence.  It is 
often argued that the United States was very concerned about Russia’s intrusion 
into the Far West of North America toward the end of the eighteenth century and 
in the first half of the nineteenth century.  In the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, for 
example, Russia was perceived as an expansionist nation moving southward along 
the West Coast of North America.  Alexis de Tocqueville referred to future global 
rivalry between Russia and the United States in his book Democracy in America, 
published in 1835 in France and in 1838 in the United States.  He is often cited as 
follows:
There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from 
different points, but seem to tend towards the same end.  I allude to the Russians and 
the Americans.  Both of them have grown up unnoticed;  and while the attention of 
mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front 
rank among the nations, and the world learned their existence and their greatness 
at almost the same time. . . .  The American struggles against the obstacles that 
nature opposes to him;  the adversaries of the Russian are men. . . .  The Anglo-
American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope 
to the unguided strength and common sense of the people;  the Russian centers all 
the authority of society in a single arm.  The principal instrument of the former is 
freedom;  of the latter, servitude.  Their starting-point is different and their courses 
are not the same;  yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway 
the destinies of half the globe. (de Tocqueville, p. 434.)
The United States became more interested in East Asia, particularly in China 
around the time when Perry was sent to Japan.  Japan was to a great extent more 
wisely prepared to respond to the mission, because Japan learned a lot from 
increasing European influences in East Asia, particularly in China.  The United 
States successfully concluded the Treaty of Kanagawa with Japan ― the Treaty of 
Peace, Amity, and Commerce between the United States and Japan ― on May 31, 
1854, after the Shogun’s acceptance of President Fillmore’s letter forcibly given 
to Japan in the previous year.  At any rate, the treaty conclusion was considered 
to be a new start for Japan as a nation in favor of friendly commercial relations 
with the United States and was followed by more than ten European nations such 
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as Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland.
Japan, in a sense, successfully seized the very opportunity to enter the Europe-
oriented international, rather than the East Asian, community by concluding the 
Treaty of Kanagawa, though unequal, without being engulfed by any European 
nation like China, particularly by Great Britain.  On the other hand, the United 
States did emerge as a new power across the Pacific from the east visibly more 
powerful than Russia.  The United States readied itself to be a major player in East 
Asia, immediately after the completion of its continental expansion in 1853 by the 
Gadsden Purchase.  The United States’ firm position in Japan was strengthened 
by diplomatic activities by Townsend Harris who was sent to Japan in August 
1856 for the purpose of concluding a commercial treaty.  Under his diplomatic 
leadership the United States further developed its relations with Japan, rivaling 
all other European nations.  The fact is undoubtedly of much significance to 
Japan that the United States was ahead of Russia in developing its diplomatic and 
commercial relations with Japan, one of the East Asian nations, which Russia had 
been more interested in approaching.
Thus the United States’ position was more advantageous than any other 
European nation in struggling for power rivalry in East Asia in the middle of 
the nineteenth century.  However, it was forced to pay more attention to its 
domestic affairs because of increasing hostilities between North and South:  the 
Civil War broke out in 1861.  During the war, the United States was inactive 
in its diplomatic conduct toward East Asia.  Even for about twenty years after 
the end of the War in 1865, much energy was directed toward consolidating the 
divided nation under the capitalist economic system, in which the United States 
succeeded.
Japan and the United States on Their Expansionist and
Imperialistic Course in East Asia after Their Domestic Turmoils
Japan and the United States were on good terms toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, even though they were both expansionist after they overcame 
their own internal difficulties.  Japan could enter a new era of modernization 
and westernization the Meiji Restoration of 1868 paved the way for, after about 
ten years of internal reconstruction in the wake of its opening to the Western 
world by concluding commercial treaties, though unequal, with more than ten 
European nations after concluding another treaty with the United States in 
1858.  On the other hand, the United States healed its own wounds of the Civil 
War and developed itself in terms of economic prosperity and political stability 
experiencing the “Reconstruction” immediately after the end of the Civil War of 
1865.  With the official announcement of the disappearance of the frontier based 
on the 1890 census date, the United States was suffocated, feeling a sense of 
thirst for expansionist imperialism in the 1890s.  Toward the end of the nineteenth 
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century and coincidentally at the end of the frontier in 1890, the United States 
in a sense came of age.  Referring to the disappearance of the frontier, Professor 
Frederick Jackson Turner concluded his paper titled “The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History,” read at the meeting of the American Historical 
Association on July 12, 1893 in Chicago.  He read that “And now, four centuries 
from the discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the 
Constitution, the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period 
of American history.” (Turner, p. 38.) What he meant is that the United States 
came to maturity as a nation, so that a new era of overseas expansion would enter 
the second chapter of American history.  Particularly in the 1880s and 1890s, the 
United States faced a lot of serious problems arising from rapid industrialization 
as a result of economic consolidation and technological innovation and capitalist 
economic practices which the “Reconstruction” produced after the end of the 
Civil War.  In his presentation, he urged overseas expansion as a solution to 
these problems.  Overseas expansion was positively considered to be a solution 
to those new problems the American Industrial Revolution produced toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, just as “continental expansion,” which brought 
the disappearance of the frontier, had functioned as a safety valve to American 
problems.
Overseas expansion was considered to be an answer to suffocation on the part 
of the United States, and the Spanish-American War of 1898 by accident turned 
out to be a concrete event of overseas expansion.  The United States won the war 
with ease and the Treaty of Peace was concluded with Spain.  By its terms, Cuba 
was to be given to the United States by Spain;  it obtained Puerto Rico and some 
small adjacent isles in the Caribbean, Guam in the Marianas, and the Philippines. 
Particularly the acquisition of the Philippines in East Asia across the Pacific gave 
political and industrial leaders an opportunity to commit themselves to economic 
activities in China, and made the United States an East Asian power as well as a 
colonial power.  The Spanish-American War graphically thus marked the new era 
of American overseas expansionism in the conduct of its foreign policy.
The United States began to gradually see what was happening in East Asia.  It 
is safe to say that the United States paid little attention to East Asia at the start of 
the administration of President William McKinley.  However, in the wake of the 
Spanish-American War, East Asia saw that the United States started to embark 
on the path of imperialism, economic, militaristic, and diplomatic.  Encouraged 
by a sense of urgency among some businessmen and capitalists about the future 
of China, particularly northern China, the McKinley administration moved 
slowly toward conducting a new policy toward China.  Responding to a sense 
of a pressing need for their over-produced manufacturers and for their over-
accumulated capital from the home market to any foreign region, the United 
States, in the name of Secretary of State John Hay, sent so-called Open Door 
Notes dated September 6, 1899 and dated July 3, 1900, to all the nations which 
had leaseholds in China.  In the First Open door Note, John Hay requested any 
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power in China to act in accordance to the following principles:
1. Within its sphere of interest or leasehold in China, no power would interfere with 
any treaty port or any vested interest.
2. The Chinese treaty tariff would be applicable within such spheres of interest, and 
the duties were to be collected by the Chinese government.
3. Within its sphere no power would discriminate in favor of its own nationals in the 
matter of harbor dues and railroad charges.
Almost all the powers were negative in responding to these U.S. requests, 
fundamentally understanding that these Notes are designed for America’s trade 
rather than China’s rights.  The Second Open Door Note proclaimed that the 
policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution which may 
reserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, and safeguard for the world 
the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire. 
Thus John Hay only announced the U.S. wish for free trade activities in China.
Japan, on the other hand, after a drastic revolution called the Meiji Restoration 
far away from the feudalism and isolationism of the Edo Era, was on its way to 
modernizing and Westernizing itself so that it could stand on an equal footing with 
the United States and European nations and as a consequence it could revise its 
unequal treaties.  Under the treaties which it had concluded, Japan suffered from 
some unjust and unequal conditions:  it had no right to regulate the rate of its own 
import duties, and gave to any treaty power the right of extra-territoriality, which 
was duly considered to be an insult to the sovereign rights of an independent 
nation.
In order for Japan to be able to revise its treaties to be just and equal, Japan 
had to become a powerful nation, to be free from foreign interventions in its 
domestic affairs, and not to be engulfed and colonized by European nations just 
like China.  So the Meiji government decided to unite itself under the emperor and 
to adopt the western way of life, quitting Asia, in other words, turning away from 
Asia, and learning from the civilized Europe.  Even though very cautious, Japan 
gradually moved toward a militarized presence in East Asia.  It is a historical 
truth that an idea of attacking Korea advocated by Takamori Saigo immediately 
after the Meiji restoration was rejected by the Meiji Government, particularly 
after the return of the Iwakura Embassy in 1873.  However, in order to ease 
some discontent in the wake of the rejection of the military inroad into Korea, 
the Meiji government successfully concluded unequal treaties with Korea and 
China, respectively, in 1876 and in 1881, just as Japan had concluded them with 
the United States and about ten Europeans nations.  These are the very first steps 
toward Japanese imperialism and colonialism in East Asia.
Then came the Sino-Japanese War in September 1894.  Toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, both China and Japan were in bad shape over the issue of 
controlling Korea.  And finally the two nations entered armed conflict.  About five 
months of military conflict came to a close in favor of Japan, to the surprise of the 
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international community.  Almost from the start of visible danger of armed conflict 
between the two nations, the United States was reluctant to positively engage itself 
with the conflict, sensing no danger to its policy in East Asia in the middle of the 
1890’s.  Rather, the United States was friendly to Japan.  On April 17, 1895, both 
sides concluded the Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which China recognized Korea 
as an independent nation and ceded Japan the island of Taiwan and the Liaotung 
Peninsula of southern Manchuria, which Japan returned to China according to the 
tripartite ― Russia, Germany and France ― advice, with the United States free 
from any intervention.  The treaty was revised and concluded at the beginning of 
May 1895.
How Japan fought in the Sino-Japanese War, however, was so impressive that 
those European nations in East Asia paid a fresh look at Japan as a nation which 
would influence the order of East Asia which had been maintained by them. 
Thus the Sino-Japanese war marked a turning point in the history of East Asia 
as well as Japan.  The international community was very much impressed with 
Japan as an emerging power in contrast to China, while the United States did not 
sensitively and seriously perceive Japan’s emerging presence in East Asia to be a 
threat to itself.  As a matter of fact, China was considered to be appallingly weak 
in the wake of the war with Japan, and as a consequence, it was easily broken up 
into foreign leaseholds.
Japan, to be sure, became visible in its relationship with its neighboring 
regions, particularly with Russia, in the conduct of its foreign policy in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  For example, Japan became very much interested 
in the northern part of the Kurile Islands, Taiwan, Korea, and China.  Gradually 
Japan as a big power in East Asia began to pose a threat to the East Asian order 
instituted by the European nations, specifically by Great Britain, in place of the 
Confucius order there.  Japan’s visibility was high first on the Korean Peninsula in 
the early years of the Meiji Era.  Japanese political leaders in the fourth quarter of 
the nineteenth century were very expansionist, drawing Korea into the Japanese 
orbit against Russia.
Emergence of Japan in East Asia and U.S. Concern about it:
From Friendship to Hostility
At the very beginning of the twentieth century, Japan and the United States 
were on good terms, particularly because the latter was still enjoying its aloofness 
even after holding the Philippines as a colonial strategic base in Asia Pacific.  In 
contrast to United States inactivity, Japan gradually increased its interests in East 
Asia ― Northern China and Korea, which were perceived by Japan as vitally 
important areas for its commercial and territorial expansion of imperialism. 
However, Japan was not free from any fear from Russian expansion toward these 
two nations.  Under this situation, Japan chose to have an alliance relationship 
with Great Britain, which also had almost the same perception of Russian 
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southward advance.  The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 proved that both 
nations were partners of strategic importance.  Owing to the alliance, Great Britain 
could afford to shift its naval strength from East Asia to the European theater and 
could manage to let Japan play a larger role in East Asia.
On the other hand, the United States was on good terms with Japan, but it 
never thought Japan to be a strategically important partner.  However, Japan 
gradually became a challenging presence to the United States, which was 
increasingly conscious of Japan’s high visibility in East Asia.  Probably the 
United States came to regard military cooperation between Great Britain and 
Japan as a manifestation of opposing its Open Door policy, even though the 
alliance was aimed at ckecking Russian southward advance into China and Korea.
Here came a turning point in the relations between the United States and 
Japan in the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century:  the Russo-
Japanese War broke out with Japan’s undeclared attack on the Russian fleet at 
Port Arthur, Manchuria, in early February 1904.  Even though the United States 
was on good terms with Russia and Japan, it was very sympathetic with Japan 
in the first stage of the war.  Both the U.S. government and the American people 
were apparently on the side of Japan in the war.  Even though the United States 
proclaimed its neutrality in mid-February 1904, it came to think that Japan should 
be a victor.  In response to Japan’s invitation to President Theodore Roosevelt to 
act as a mediator, he came to a final decision that his effort at acting as a mediator 
would serve the best interests of the United States by bringing the hostilities to 
an end.  Thanks to President Roosevelt’s mediation, Japan could win the war 
with Russia by a small margin, with considerable territorial gains from Russia. 
Particularly both in Korea and in Manchuria, Japan became a more visible and 
powerful presence, while the United States gradually came to have a concern for 
the balance of power in East Asia, with Japan in mind.  The United States began 
to place Japan in its security strategy.  On the other hand, even though the United 
States made a positive contribution to ending the Russo-Japanese War, seemingly 
on behalf of Japan, Japan also began to place the United States in its security 
strategy.
There was over-confidence among the Japanese people, who were not better 
informed of how costly the war was to their country, simply because of their 
sense of victory over Russia, a great European nation.  Most of the Japanese 
people were very proud of their nation’s rapid emergence and rise as an Asian 
nation in East Asia, believing in its rise to power and prestige among the leading 
great powers of the day.  And what was worse in the years after the end of the 
war, Japan’s interest shifted from Korea to Manchuria, China’s north-eastern 
provinces, which had been minor to Korea in Japanese foreign policy.  The 
importance of Korea was major;  that of Manchuria minor before Japan reached a 
final decision to wage war against Russia in early February 1904.
The more interested in Manchuria Japan came to be, the more serious the 
United States came to be about Japan’s expansion into northern China because of 
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its Open Door policy.  So the United States and Japan were antagonistic toward 
each other, regarding each other as a threat.  After the conclusion of the Russo-
Japanese War with the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, which President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s mediation intentionally produced, the United States and Japan began 
to observe each other as a potential hypothetical enemy in a newly emerging East 
Asian order of peace and stability.  Japan began to be very sensitive to the rise of 
the United States to major naval power status with an uncompromising desire for 
maintenance of its Open Door policy toward China, and to the U.S. presence in the 
Philippines as a potential threat to the security of Taiwan which Japan had gained 
as a fruit of the war with China toward the end of the previous century.  Japan 
became very serious about its national defense in the process of the war with 
China and the war with Russia.  And at the same time Japan was very watchful 
about U.S. attitude toward Japan apparent in the process of its mediation under the 
administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, who was seen as an expansionist 
as well as an imperialist.  Under these situations Japan began to put an emphasis 
on the well-balanced combination of effective diplomacy and a well-coordinated 
defense policy in the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, 
immediately after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War.  Concretely, both the 
Army and Navy General Staffs began to secretly draft a national defense policy, 
with an alliance with Great Britain as a core.  In 1907, the Imperial National 
Defense Policy was crafted, which designated the United States as a number one 
hypothetical enemy.  For the first time in the history of Japanese defense policy, 
this national defense policy was the very first military plan, in which Japan put an 
emphasis on one comprehensive objective ― a military establishment capable of 
meeting the strategic threats posed by the Russian army and the American navy. 
The United States, on the other hand, almost at the same time began to work for 
making a military strategy, which was called the Orange Plan, in which Japan 
was regarded as a hypothetical enemy.  Now in the first decade of the twentieth 
century East Asia turned out to be a region for power rivalry, in which two rapidly 
emerging powers ― Japan and the United States ― were competing for a position 
of supremacy, rather for a sphere of influence and interest, with Great Britain 
gradually out of sight from the strategic environment in East Asia.
East Asian Order of Peace and Stability
Dominated by the United States
About a decade later, a great chance came to Japan:  Japan became a 
participating nation in the Great War of 1914―18, due to the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance.  And Japan was as a matter of course invited to the Versailles Conference 
of 1919 as one of the five major victors in the war, even though its role in the war 
was minimal.  The United States, on the other hand, finally entered the “war to end 
all wars,” making the greatest contribution to defeating Germany and played the 
major role in creating the League of Nations under the political and philosophical 
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leadership of President Woodrow Wilson.  The United States, however, could not 
join the League, returning to “normalcy.”
In the 1920s, international relations in East Asia entered a new post-Great War 
phase.  Despite its denial to join the League of Nations, the United States was very 
positive in creating a new order of peace and stability in East Asia in the interest 
of the United States based on its Open Door policy.  The new East Asian order was 
embodied in three treaties concluded at the Washington Conference of 1921―22: 
(1) the Four Power Treaty;  (2) the Five Power Treaty;  and (3) the Nine Power 
Treaty.  The primary objective of the Conference initiated by the United States, 
which was thought to have returned to isolationism after the end of the Great War, 
was to discuss naval limitations and some East Asian and Pacific issues among 
concerned nations, sticking to its Open Door policy.  The Five Power Treaty was 
on naval armament, limiting the size of capital ships and setting the tonnage that 
the United States, Great Britain and Japan could hold at a ratio of 5:  5:  3.  The 
Four Power Treaty forced Japan to sever its alliance relation with Great Britain. 
And in the Nine Power Treaty, the U.S. Open Door policy was internationally 
accepted.
Leadership in this conference by the United States was so impressive and 
influential that U.S. East Asian policy of the Open Door policy was internationally 
approved.  In fact, in this conference, the United States apparently made every 
possible effort at reducing Japanese influence to a nil, primarily breaking 
Japan’s military ties with Great Britain and keeping Japanese military capabilities 
far below those of the United States and approving the U.S. Open Door Policy 
as a basis for the East Asian order. U.S. success in this conference for creating a 
new order in East Asia endorsed U.S. eagerness to commit itself to the region and 
an internationally approved position of U.S. supremacy in the region.  And as a 
result, Japan was driven into a corner of inferiority.
Conclusion
What happened in the first two decades of the twentieth century ― the 
Russo-Japanese War, the Great War, and the Washington Conference, to name 
a few ― made Japan be a nation of gradual subordination to the United States 
in the struggle for regional supremacy among a few powers in East Asia.  Due 
to additional reasons, Japan and the United States, as a consequence, were on 
a collision course in the 1930s and 1940s, and an answer from Japan to U.S. 
policies was a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Japan being 
driven into a corner of inferiority.  And a defeated Japan was allowed to breathe 
under the occupation by the United States, blessed with the “pacifist” Constitution 
of May 3, 1947, a product of good-natured America, then free from fear of Soviet 
Communism.
At the beginning of this article, the author refers to the recent Japan-U.S. 
relations.  The current bilateral relations were a product of 150 years of relations 
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between the two nations. Commodore Mathew Perry marked the very beginning 
of the bilateral relations in 1853.  Since then, Japan toward the end of the Edo Era 
went through a variety of internal conflicts, learning how to live as a nation in the 
world community, particularly in East Asia.  And Japan reached a conclusion:  a 
bloodless revolution of the Meiji Restoration.  Meiji Japan was unequal in its 
relations with European nations and with the United States.  In order to be equal 
to them and not to be overcome by them, Japan had to learn a lot to become 
European and American.
The United States has been ambivalent in its relations with Japan.  For the first 
half a century the United States was very friendly to Japan in contrast to European 
nations.  Even over the issue of treaty revision, the most urgent issue facing the 
Meiji government, the United States was sympathetic with Japan, even though 
America represented by Mr. John Bingham was not so easy about any influence 
of Great Britain upon Japan.  When he served as a minister to Japan from 1873 
through 1885, John Bingham was rather often on the side of Japan as to its 
concern for equal standing in its relations with foreign nations.  Whenever the 
United States was worried about Russia’s attitude toward East Asia, it was always 
in favor of Japan’s way of thinking about its foreign policy toward East Asia, 
specifically toward Korea and then Manchuria.
However, as Japan became aggressive abroad or even a bit interested in East 
Asia, the United States became very much concerned about Japan in place of 
Russia, particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Specifically the 
Russo-Japanese War changed the United States in its attitude toward Japan.  It is 
easy to observe that it was due to much concern about Japan’s possible rivalry in 
East Asia in place of Russia on the part of the United States that the United States 
mediated the Russo-Japanese War.  In fact, each nation became more attentive to 
each other’s schemes in East Asia in the years after the end of the Russo-Japanese 
War, as is mentioned above.
The Washington Conference of 1921―22 marked a decisive turning point in 
the bilateral relations, paving the way for the outbreak of war about twenty years 
later between the two nations in early December 1941.  About twenty years of 
hostility toward the United States brought Japan to Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii in 
a military way.＊
The United States has at long last become a predominantly unrivalled power 
in East Asia by winning the war against Japan in East Asia in the summer of 1945, 
＊When it comes to what has been happening in Japan’s relations with its neighboring nations 
such as the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, this author has been very 
much interested in and worried about it. His understanding is that it has a long history of 
Japanese overseas aggressions for power rivalry, conscious of advanced European nations 
and the United States, a rapidly industrialized nation in the “new” world, starting with the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894―5, not with the Manchurian Incident of 1931. He has been doing 
another research on atrocities caused by the Japanese militarism in the Asia-Pacific War.
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primarily because the United States did not allow the Soviet Union to occupy 
part of Japan, even though it had made a compromise at the Yalta Conference 
in February 1945 with the latter by allowing it to gain the Kurile chain and by 
restoring the southern half of Sakhalin Island and territorial rights in Manchuria 
which Russia had lost as a consequence of its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. 
The Soviet Union did come back to East Asia to a certain extent after forty years 
of absence there.  And the so-called Cold War, a new type of war, developed 
gradually between the United States and the Soviet Union conspicuously even in 
East Asia in the wake of World War II.  And Japan was placed in the U.S. security 
strategy of the containment of Soviet Communism in East Asia toward the end 
of the 1940s, with Japan as a pacifist nation being under complete control of U.S. 
military strategy.
[This article is a product of my unfinished research on “U.S. Minister to Japan John 
Bingham’s Role in Japan’s Modernization and Westernization” done with the aid of 
“2004 Pache Research Subsidy 1―A―2” and “2005 Short-Term Research Abroad.”]
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